Indian Election Integrity: "Everything Everywhere All at Once"
The BJP IT Cell - China, Russia and Pakistan - India as a Threat Actor
Hey there.
It’s time for Part 2 of the Indian chapter on Election and Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI). China, Pakistan and Russia are on the menu.
But before being discussing FIMI actors, we need to talk more about the main online threat actor trying to take control of the narrative during the Indian election. The BJP IT Cell.
Let’s dive in!
What to be expected:
Indian Lok Sabha Election - The BJP IT Cell
During the Indian election cycle, the power that the BJP holds over the cyber space becomes particularly visible. As we discussed last week, this power results in many internet shutdowns, pressure on platforms to take down accounts and content, and intimidation of journalists and activists. It also includes a strategy to leverage WhatsApp discussions to incite hatred and violence against minorities such as Muslims.
Moreover, in its quest to suppress free speech and dissenting voices while promoting its own narratives, the BJP is known to have an IT Cell in charge of its political campaigns on social networks. However, the BJP’s political campaigns do not ressemble any other political campaigns. The investment of all social networks, the recruitment of partisans and the intensity of the efforts characterize the BJP’s unique endeavors to control the minds and perceptions of Indians regarding the party.
The BJP has deployed tropes and is using tactic, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to discredit its adversaries. The TTPs used are not new and date back to even before the last 2019 elections. However, as technology continues to improve and the scalability of operation increases thanks to AI, these TTP seem quite effective in achieving the BJP’s goal – its reelection. How is the BJP operating?
The BJP IT Cell was created in 2007. According to Prodyut Bora, the individual who set it up at the time, its creation was not intended for it to evolve into what it is today. When he first suggested it, he believed it could be the best way to stay connected with voters. There were three objectives: “to automate the part, to reach out to the voters, and advise the party on policy matters.”
According to him, the cell was not about manipulating users, but about developing new technologies to engage with them, and bridge the urban-rural divide.
However, everything changed during the 2014 elections when the cell fell in the hands of the BJP’s party.
Since then, the BJP has been known to deploy an army of bots and trolls on Twitter to propagate their messages. These messages are disseminated to journalists and influencers who can echo the narratives to local communities. This army is composed of radical supporters of Indian Prime Minister Modi, many of whom are personally followed by him. Being followed by the Prime Minister or members of his party is considered as an honor and a signal to promote the party’s narratives and dismiss any criticism.
On Facebook and WhatsApp, as we touched upon last week, the BJP is also present to push narratives of hatred targeting minorities. But there is more. The BJP appeared in 2019 to use the services of the Association of Billion Minds (ABM), a political consulting firm linked to the BJP’s party members, to spread false content on these platforms. The firm used political ads to amplify these false claims.
But how does the cell operate today? The Washington Post provided us a rare insight last year as it managed to interview BJP staffers in Karnataka, a state in southwest India, during the state legislative assembly elections in spring 2023.
Content creation: BJP staffers and the party’s allies develop narratives that integrate the audience vulnerabilities, such as the fears of the Hindu majority regarding, for instance, claims that the Muslim minority represents a threat to their security. The content includes text, photos and logos, which are considered to be “the most attention-grabbing and shareable for on WhatsApp”. However, the most polarizing content is not made by BJP staffers, but by influencers.
Courting influencers: Content creators also collaborate with the party to run troll pages. These pages disseminate extremely viral content to excite the audiences. Some influencers can play a role as trolls to flood content on Facebook and WhatsApp. The article mentions “Astra”, an influencer/troll, that is courted by BJP candidates for his strong militant voice, which can incite offline protests and violence against Muslims.
Accelerating the spread of inflammatory content: the BJP’s narratives strategy is tied to the election cycle. As election day approaches, more inflammatory content is spread to sow hatred among the population. For example, the influencer Astra developed a narrative comparing the election “to a struggle between nationalists (the BJP) and terrorists (the Congress party).” To that end, existing content can be edited such as speeches
Content dissemination: to reach a maximum audience, the BJP conducts offline campaign too. Volunteer fieldworkers canvassed to collect voter registration information and phone numbers to add them to WhatsApp groups. In total,150 000 social workers are in charge of disseminating the created content across WhatsApp groups. This strategy highlights why the Indian election is often referred to as being played out on mobile phones.
The Post article did not mention AI at the time. But GenAI has also made its way in the Indian election. It does not replace the previous tactics but can enhance them and increase the scalability of the BJP’s operations. AI is used in many ways according to this article from Al-Jazeera:
On Instagram, Prime Minister Modi is the subject of many AI-generated images. He is styled as Bhishma Pitamah from the ancient Hindu epic Mahabharata, creating an image of a reincarnation of the supreme commander Bhishma. He is also portrayed as a divine figure or the King of Hindu Rashtra
AI can be also used to create false images of local political leaders performing actions such as launching free meals scheme for students and posing with farmers.
A popular use of GenAI in Indian elections is to create “ghost appearances” of past deceased leaders in videos. Several deceased politicians and influencers’ voices are resurrected to express criticism or support for current political parties.
Indian voters appear to be flooded with voices from prominent figures, current or dead, who use their digital social authority to influence their voting choices in the upcoming election. They are also vulnerable to other threat actors…
Indian Lok Sabha Election - FIMI Actors
Alongside the BJP, Indian election could realistically be targeted by FIMI - information manipulation and interference activities conducted by foreign actors.
Last year, the university of Navarra and XKDR Forum published a report on concerns about FIMI in the Indian context. It was interesting to note the use of the term FIMI for the first time in an Indian environment. This report sought to bring an Indian perspective on this term and gives us clues as to what we can expect from foreign threat actors targeting India in the next elections.
It is perhaps important first to recall India’s position in the region and in international relations. India seeks to play a role on the international stage by developing partnerships while cultivating its strategic autonomy. Historically non-aligned, the year 2023 showcased its effort to be seen as an actor working towards regional peace and stability, with India holding the presidency of the G20 and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In the Indo-Pacific region, India also aims to be recognized as a superpower, balancing Chinese efforts in the region. India has multiplicated summits in the region and worked towards improving regional connectivity and maritime security.
This is not without displeasing China, which was overtaken by India last April 2023 when India became the world’s most populous nation. While the two states have grown closer since the late 1980s, they have been competing over the last decade. Especially, military tensions at their common Himalayan border have been frequent creating frictions in diplomatic relations. Furthermore, India have shown an increased tendency to lean towards Washington and new strategic alliances such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. While India seeks to approach these partnerships on its own terms, according to NBR’s analysis, it has been perceived by China as an attempt to contain its rise and its presence in the region.
On the other hand, Russia has long been a key partner of India, especially in the security and defense arena. Since the Cold War, the two countries have developed a military-technical cooperation partnership. India relies on Russia for several critical technologies such as cruise missiles and fighter aircrafts. Despite the Ukrainian war, Moscow and New Delhi’s relationship appears unaffected, with India also providing financial support to Moscow.
Last but not least, Pakistan is also a significant actor in India’s neighborhood. Both countries have long claimed sovereignty over the disputed region Jammu and Kashmir since their simultaneous independence in 1947. In the context of this year’s election, there are particular expectations in the region for holding regional elections and restoring Jammu and Kashmir’s statehood, supported by allegations of long-unkept promises from Prime Minister Modi. Local frustrations and resentment against the BJP could make the issue of Jammu and Kashmir particularly inflammatory and may encourage Pakistan to interfere.
There have been claims that Pakistan attempts to manipulate the Indian cyberspace through several TTPs:
Creation of fake profiles and personas to disseminate false narratives, hatred, and calls for protests within India.
These inauthentic accounts spread false stories, manipulated images and videos to distort facts.
The content exploits political, social and identity vulnerabilities such as religion, caste and political affiliation. They also amplify existing divise issues.
Now returning to our report on FIMI and India, what are the other TTPs presented regarding China?
Facilitating state propaganda through developed-owned media assets and creating localized content: Chinese-affiliated state media outlets have developed localized content in Hindi, Bengali, Tamil and Urdu. They have a social presence on Facebook and YouTube. Xinhua is also known to provide free content to India news agencies and outlets.
Recruitment and training of journalists: this tactic is not limited to India, but China has been inviting Indian journalists to programs in China where they are exposed to the official Chinese narrative on many issues to be conveyed in the Indian media space.
Delivering advertorials: China has also developed advertorials to be published in major Indian newspaper.
Wolf-warrior diplomacy: this TTP seems to have been used in the past, but faced some backlashes.
Using proxies: the report also hints at the way China has been using India’s neighbors to spread a negative image of India on topical issues such as the Belt and Road initiative.
The report also gives away some ideas on the TTPs used by Russia in India. This section is more hypothetic than previously observed TTPs in India:
India may have been a target of a Russian marketing firm’s campaign spreading manipulated information to discredit the efficacy of the Pfizer and AstraXeneca vaccines. Much of the content was posted in Hindi and could have been a way to undermine an Indian company producing one of the two vaccines.
When India chose to abstain from voting on the UNGA Resolution ES-11/1 on 2 March 2022 to condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine, a pro-Russian Twitter campaign started with the hashtags #IStandWithPutin #isupportrussia #IndiaWithRussia. The report suggests that the pro-Russian Twitter accounts in India are likely to be part of a coordinated operation to drive opinion in favor of Russia. However, there is no evidence of the Russian origin of the accounts.
Indian websites appear to be used as layers to launder Russian narratives to English-speaking audiences.
While this report is valuable in summarizing these threats, it appears to lack from evidence and observations from researchers and investigators, who may not have yet had the resources to monitor the online information environment with a view to detecting FIMI.
The report calls for increased cooperation, particularly between the EU and India. It underlines that Indian researchers are not directly eligible for research grants under the Horizon Europe funding program, but suggests that a dedicated program could be created. It also outlines other recommendations, regarding civil society education, journalist and media empowerment, and technological innovation.
Beyond the report, it is important to note other calls for cooperation. The Indian newspaper The Sunday Guardian Live conveys a call from two professors, Alan Hao Yang and Sana Hashmi, for Taiwan-India cooperation to counter information manipulation operations coming from China. They argue that there are ample opportunities for collaboration between India and Taiwan, who face a common challenge. They call for India to actively engage in the Taiwan-led Global cooperation and training framework and suggest establishing a working group at the government level to mutually benefit from each other.
This election year could indeed be a strategic year, shaping and defining future strategic alliances to come or reinforcing existing stances and perspectives on the international order.
Let’s Not Forget India As a Threat Actor
Before closing the Indian chapter for the moment, let’s not forget that India also acts as a threat actor targeting other countries with FIMI operations.
One of the most well-known FIMI operations is the campaign labelled the “Indian Chronicles”, uncovered by the EU Disinfo Lab. They did an extensive investigation to expose the strategy and dynamics of this 15-year operation. If you haven’t already, I recommend taking the time to delve into their report.
For the lazy readers, here are the key facts EU Disinfo Lab compiled:
Lately, another operation has been revealed by the Rapid Response Mechanism Canada, the unit in the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in charge of monitoring and detecting FIMI. The report was presented at the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference.
It shows that, in 2021, according to a DFRLab’s investigation, pro-BJP influencers, media outlets and journalists “worked in concert, likely employing covert or automated accounts, to target Mr. Dhaliwal on at least the following social media platforms: Facebook, Twitter and YouTube.” Several media outlets are mentioned and described as having published articles to spread conspiracy theories. Mr. Dhaliwal, a Canadian Sikh activist and founder of a Canadian advocacy group, was targeted by harassment and intimidating campaigns as well.
Last year, the death of a Sikh separatist advocate - linked to agents of the government of India by the Canadian government - staged protests among the diaspora in Canada and increased fears that these online campaigns and harassment could lead to real life consequences.
Another example that information operations are not virtual separate operations, but part of a common strategy for threat actors to achieve their goals on the international stage.
Your Press Corner
Here’s the weekly readings to keep you connected to all the conversation on global elections and information operations:
Before you start looking at this week’s reads, make sure you have subscribe to the new EDMO newsletter focusing on 2024 European Elections: EUROPEAN DIGITAL MEDIA OBSERVATORY - Newsroom Subscription Form (europa.eu). Everyday. a daily update from the EDMO Task Force on the latest news and narratives regarding the EU upcoming Parliament Elections.
France fights disinformation as Olympics, elections loom – DW – 04/12/2024 - With the Paris Olympics and Paralympics approaching — not to mention the European elections in June — France is ramping up its fight against information manipulation. EU officials are also on guard.
European elections are particularly at risk of foreign interference (lemonde.fr) - Structurally more vulnerable than others to propaganda operations, the June elections will be a real-life test for the Digital Services Act, the new European regulation on platform moderation.
Russia paid pro-Kremlin lawmakers to influence EU elections, says Belgium (ft.com) - Authorities investigating cash payments to MEPs ahead of June vote, says PM Alexander De Croo.
Pro-Russian Voice of Europe back online from Kazakhstan – Euractiv - The outlet Voice of Europe, allegedly involved in a pro-Russian propaganda network, has restarted operations based in Kazakhstan after it was ousted from the Czech Republic last month, Euractiv’s data shows.
Russia and the Far-Right: Insights From Ten European Countries | International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - ICCT - Long-read.
Secret Russian foreign policy document urges action to weaken the U.S. - The Washington Post - Russia’s Foreign Ministry has been drawing up plans to try to weaken its Western adversaries, including the United States, and leverage the Ukraine war to forge a global order free from what it sees as American dominance, according to a secret Foreign Ministry document.
Americans Are More Vulnerable to Foreign Propaganda, Senator Warns - The New York Times (nytimes.com) - Senator Mark Warner, the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, said the United States was more susceptible to Russian influence operations than it was during the 2020 elections.
Russian US election interference targets support for Ukraine after slow start - Microsoft On the Issues - Russian efforts are focused on undermining U.S. support for Ukraine while China seeks to exploit societal polarization and diminish faith in U.S. democratic systems.
Distrust in elections spreads in democracies around the world | International | EL PAÍS English (elpais.com) - A survey conducted by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance shows that, in 11 of 19 countries analyzed, less than half of voters think that the last elections were free and fair.
The principles and guidelines on social media in African elections - Namibia Fact Check - The Principles and Guidelines is an initiative of the Association of African Electoral Authorities (AAEA), which adopted the Principles and Guidelines at its general assembly in Cotonou, Benin, in November 2023.
How Meta Is Preparing for the 2024 South African Elections | Meta (fb.com) - Meta now recurrent announcement regarding its role in an election.
POLITICO Editorial series: Bots and ballots – POLITICO - a comprehensive series of article by POLITICO on AI and Elections.
Preparing to Fight AI-Backed Voter Suppression | Brennan Center for Justice - AI tools could make it easier than ever for bad actors to wage campaigns aimed at suppressing votes.
Mozilla commissions CheckFirst to conduct a stress test of Ad Repositories - CheckFirst - This report examines the ad transparency tools of 11 of the world’s largest tech companies, looking particularly at their usability for researchers. Spoiler: None of the scrutinised platforms completely achieved CheckFirst’s baseline criteria which they developed for this “stress test”.
Tracker: What US Senators Are Saying About TikTok Legislation | TechPolicy.Press - Tech Policy Press has rounded up public statements made by senators that are relevant to the prospects for a companion version of the House legislation.
The Creeping Influence of the Extreme Right’s Meme Subculture in Southeast Asia’s TikTok Community – GNET (gnet-research.org) - this insight aims to (1) identify direct Western extreme right influences on the Southeast Asian extreme right community; (2) investigate efforts to localise Western extreme right meme culture by incorporating regional symbols, lexicon, and historical narratives; and (3) examine instances where users deviate from the stereotypical extreme right profile, instead expressing sympathies towards other ideologies across the extremist spectrum.