Angola & Kenya 2022 Elections: Memes, Mercenaries and More.
Angola 2022 General Election - Kenya 2022 General Election - FIMI, a Western Concept? - Your Press Corner
Hey there,
Here are the final findings of the recent publication “Digital Disinformation in Africa,” edited by Tony Roberts and George Hamandishe Karekwaivanane and composed of many contributions discussing the situation in ten African countries: Nigeria, Cameroon, Angola, Mozambique, Egypt, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Today’s newsletter will be dedicated to summarizing the 2022 Angola and Kenya general elections’ related cases of disinformation and information manipulation. I will then share with you a reflection I have been having after 5 months of reading about election-related manipulation of information cases. Are our glasses to monitor these online manipulated activities correctly adjusted, or are we looking at a distorted reality?
What to be expected:
Angola’s 2022 General Election: Memes Activism
In “Digital Disinformation in Africa”, Edmilson Angelo, Postgraduate researcher at the Institute of Development Studies, discusses the cases of disinformation and information manipulation that occurred during Angola’s 2022 general election. He addresses both the disinformation spread by the state and the forms of counter-disinformation deployed by citizens, including online memes.
During the 21st century, Angola has been one of the fastest-growing economies thanks to its oil resources. However, this growth has come with many domestic vulnerabilities, such as poverty, inequality, an infrastructure crisis, and corruption.
Youth play a central role in the country, especially in leading anti-government protests on social media. Facebook, Pinterest, YouTube, and, to some extent, Twitter and Instagram have become places of digital contestation and political opposition. Access to the internet is nevertheless unequal, being mainly reserved for urban areas.
In Angola, the importance of the digital space for the youth became evident when President Lourenco launched his official Facebook page in 2017. He stated at the time that this online space would be used to discuss “the main issues that affect the youth.” He, therefore, sent a signal to this part of the population that political matters of significance to them would now be discussed online.
Meanwhile, as we saw in the previous chapters of this newsletter, the government used legal means to suppress free speech. For example, a new article in the Penal Code of Angola was proposed to condemn “mimicry, jokes or critical commentary of the President of the Republic and organs of sovereignty, particularly online.”
The media landscape is also growing weaker as freedom of the press is decreasing. The state controls public media institutions, thus limiting the development of a free and independent media landscape.
Against this background, how did online activity unfold during Angola’s 2022 election? To answer this question, the author used “digital ethnography” to examine the techniques and actors associated with cases of disinformation and information manipulation on Facebook and Instagram six months before the election and for one month after. The author also supplemented his research with interviews with social media account holders from the youth community. He presents four cases of disinformation and online manipulation:
A defamation campaign targeted the leader of the opposition party, Adalberto Costa Junior, putting into question the veracity of his academic degree. The campaign followed an information laundering strategy: the false claim was initially spread by the Portuguese media, then by the ruling party and its influencers, and finally by the establishment media. However, instead of further discrediting the opposition leader, the government's appropriation of this false claim garnered new support from Angolan youth, who created a hashtag promoting him. The author concludes that a lie appearing to serve political interests can lead to increased support for the victim of that lie.
Another defamation campaign against Adalberto Costa Junior questioned his nationality status, as he once held both Portuguese and Angolan citizenship before renouncing the former. Holding dual citizenship would disqualify Adalberto Costa Junior from campaigning in the election. The government used the Supreme Court to spread the claim that he still held both citizenships, thereby invalidating his nomination as the opposition party’s leader. Nonetheless, this procedure's outcome brought him further support.
Violent events in the country were attributed to the opposition party to create a negative image. The ruling party, supported by the media, attributed an attack on a ruling party office to the opposition party. Images and videos spread where individuals claimed to be members of the opposition. These artifacts were amplified by Angolan national television and other national channels and then shared on social media through ruling party-controlled pages. However, an investigation revealed that the individuals responsible for the attack were linked to a radical protest by taxi drivers against police discrimination and a recent government decree.
The ruling party promoted the narrative of fighting corruption to discredit the opposition party. Claims were made that the opposition party was receiving money from an individual involved in corruption cases. The media played a significant role in promoting this claim to the general audience, notably through TV interviews and programs.
In response to these cases of disinformation and information manipulation, Angolan youth did not stay silent. They used the strategies of “memes” and “mockery” to counter these online manipulated activities.
For example, the illustration above was a response to the second defamation campaign against the opposition leader, which involved the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court being instrumentalized to suppress the right of Adalberto Costa Junior to participate in the election.
According to an interview the author conducted, one of the creators of these memes stated, "We create visual communication in the form of memes to respond to any government decision that violates our rights or takes us for a joke. This is us showing them that they are the real jokers if they think we are not aware of what is going on." The power of imagery in political spaces is underscored and explains the choice of Instagram to circulate these memes. Meanwhile, TV is associated with media controlled by the government.
It is noteworthy that in the context of Angola, the use or rejection of certain mediums are political choices, aligning with the theory developed by Marshall McLuhan in his book "The Medium is the Massage: An Inventory of Effects." The use of Instagram or Facebook to convey a message inherently represents youth activism and resistance against the Angolan government’s information manipulation and disinformation activities.
The author concludes by highlighting the special role that social media play in the political online space in Angola, providing new forms of engagement and resistance.
Kenya’s 2022 Election: Mercenaries for Hire and Media Strategy
This chapter, written by Senior researcher and lecturer Wambui Wamunyu, relates the events surrounding the last 2022 Kenya general elections. Kenya is known for having been the target of information manipulation and interference activities from the British consulting firm Cambridge Analytica during both the 2013 and 2017 elections. However, this chapter focuses on another aspect of the disinformation dynamics in the country, namely the role of Kenyan news media and mercenaries for hire.
The Kenyan news media environment has seen multiple changes. Before the Second World War, the broadcasting sector was first owned by colonial authorities while newspapers were established by multiple stakeholders, both pro- and anti-Independence. In the aftermath of the Second World War, various mediums were used, such as “pamphlets, films, and songs carrying coded messages.” In the 1970s and 1980s, propaganda from repressive regimes or the British government’s foreign office spread in the information space. In the 1990s, the liberalization of the state-controlled news media sector brought new private sector players competing for audiences on television and radio stations. The internet amplified this trend with the adoption of digital technologies.
The author underscores that one constant trend in the Kenyan news media sector is its perception as a pillar of democratic society, even though it has not been able to avoid political attempts to control the news media.
Today, the news media faces other challenges such as a decline in audience and advertising revenues, as well as a lack of financial stability for journalists. These challenges have led to the sharing of disinformation by Kenyan news media outlets. This new precarity of Kenyan news media has created an overall vulnerability, as the Kenyan audience relies on this source of information and still considers this ecosystem a reliable source of news.
Digital practices have also evolved since the introduction of the internet in the country in 1995. In 2019, a study showed that the majority of Kenyans used WhatsApp, Facebook, and YouTube. Instagram and Twitter are also used, but to a lesser extent. By 2022, TikTok was widely used as well. These social media platforms are mainly used to access news and political information.
To cover the disinformation and information manipulation cases that unfolded during the 2022 Kenya election, the author reviewed documents, mostly from Africa Check and Kenya Editors Guild, conducted a series of interviews with journalists, a media researcher, and a social media influencer, as well as a focus group discussion with five media analysts.
He then provides six examples of disinformation and information manipulation cases that occurred during the election, which disclose several patterns.
Incorrect claims were disseminated by one of the political campaign’s representatives on Inooro FM, a radio station with more than 470 000 followers on Facebook, making it one of the leading broadcast outlets.
Incorrect information was shared due to the ownership of a media outlet. Here the Star, owned by Radio Africa, which is affiliated with presidential candidate William Ruto, shared a misleading poll showing Ruto’s ally, Musalia Mudavadi, winning against another candidate. Although the Star rectified the incorrect information, it was interpreted as an “intentional error” from the media outlet.
False front pages, false quotes and false information about reputable journalists. These tactics targeted news media brands and journalists and appeared to have relied on the use of “mercenaries for hire” - local content creators and influencers who create and disseminate disinformation for monetary gain.
False information attributed to branded news outlets. This tactic, which is similar to what we have seen in Europe and the U.S. with the fake branding of news articles, was used to discredit some politicians.
Defamation campaign against journalists. A claim circulated that a journalist was running for a member of parliament seat. The claim was based on a campaign poster that circulated on social media.
The author highlights the "deluge" of disinformation that spread during the Kenyan elections, likely due to the "mercenaries for hire" phenomenon. Politicians employed these mercenaries to create and disseminate disinformation and information manipulation on social media. For influencers, this became a source of livelihood.
This election revealed how politicians used the Kenyan news media landscape, such as radio stations, to spread false and misleading claims that are difficult to quickly debunk. As politicians become more aware of the role of mainstream media and social media in disseminating narratives, they hire strategists to develop these narratives and tactics to influence public opinion. Politicians also used their ownership and business ties with news media to control the narratives being spread.
On the other side, counter-information efforts were insufficient. The lack of resources and investment in fact-checking and investigative journalism contributed to the disproportionate response. Additionally, the public's lack of critical thinking and ability to assess the veracity of information exacerbated the issue.
This concludes this overview of the book "Digital Disinformation in Africa," published at the end of April. This unique dive into the specificities of disinformation and information manipulation activities in African countries demonstrates that information manipulation as we understand it in the West might take a complete other meaning in a non-Western country.
FIMI, a Western Concept?
Reading about these cases of information manipulation and disinformation in African countries makes me question the relevance of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) being applied at a global scale. While there have been instances of online manipulation driven by foreign actors, such as Prigozhin/Wagner group, most of these phenomena seem to be driven by domestic actors attempting to hold onto power, as described in “Digital Disinformation in Africa.”
In previous editions of this newsletter, when we examined cases in Indonesia or India, I already felt that FIMI as a concept might not fully capture the online dynamics at play. Often, I found myself switching to DIMI (Domestic Information Manipulation and Interference) to better reflect the nature of these activities.
While FIMI provides Western nations with a common definition for discussing this topic, facilitating information sharing and potential counter-actions, it would be extremely disappointing to ignore the reality in other countries, the “Global Majority,” simply because these realities are not encompassed by the concept of FIMI. The use of Generative AI in Indonesian elections by political campaigns, the BJP WhatsApp strategy, or the leveraging of the media sector in Kenya are all relevant aspects of online manipulation that cannot be ignored if we are to prevent these harms in the future.
However, it is challenging, almost impossible, to engage on these topics without a common definition to describe these dynamics. Social media platforms have their respective policies, which are not necessarily harmonized. Governmental institutions have their own laws and taxonomies, and when they engage in multilateral formats, they must resort to definitions that can be unanimously accepted. The general rule in these formats is that the more stakeholders at the table, the more ambiguous the definition becomes.
Civil society, while very much aware of these topics, often has no significant influence. And when it does have a voice, it tends to come from larger, well-funded, and well-networked organizations typically based in Western countries.
One interesting proposal that came out recently is the “Study on International Norms for Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI)” prepared by Dr. Talita Dias. for the EEAS as part of the FPI initiative promoted by the EU-CAN Policy Dialogue Support Facility. It lays out the relevant international law concepts and norms that could apply to further distinguish FIMI into three types of helpful categories: “lawful but harmful FIMI”, “potentially unlawful FIMI”, “clearly unlawful FIMI”.
This approach is interesting because it tackles directly the strategic disadvantage democratic states face compared to authoritarian states regarding infrastructure exploitation in a free and open internet. However, the study builds on current Western norms of the global international order - norms that we have seen being seriously challenged in the last years. Will this be enough to support the resilience of FIMI as an applicable concept to the multiple facets of online information manipulation?
May 16th.
As we approach the middle of 2024, the second part of the year looks darker, with the Council of the EU presided over by the priorities of the Hungarian pro-Russia far-right leader, Viktor Orbán, and the U.S. watching with both fear and excitement the potential re-election of Donald Trump. While the West deals with the ghosts from its past and faces its broken politics of memory, the Global Majority should not wait passively. There are upcoming opportunities to give voice to these different perspectives and upset the Western language. How to prepare for this, you ask?
Report with self-discipline, archive the evidence, prepare the argument.
Online, offline. Add a little swing.
It might indeed be time to change the narrative.
Your Press Corner
Here’s the weekly readings to keep you connected to all the conversation on global elections and information operations:
Russia-Linked CopyCop Uses LLMs to Weaponize Influence Content at Scale | Recorded Future - New Report covering the campaign published by Clemson University and its European version False Facade uncovered by the EEAS Stratcom in collaboration with Spanish authorities.
Russian Disinformation Videos Smear Biden Ahead of U.S. Election - The New York Times (nytimes.com) - Many of the videos are trying to appeal to right-wing voters with fake messages about President Biden, experts say.
Investigation: Who is Ilya Gambashidze, the man the US government accuses of running a Kremlin disinformation campaign? (voanews.com) - According to the U.S. government, Russian political consultant Ilya Gambashidze is responsible for a large-scale disinformation campaign aimed at undermining trust in democratic processes and institutions in the United States and beyond.
Europe Takes Aim at Putin's Secret Weapon (newsweek.com) - The European Union is mulling a plan to ban Russian financing for political parties and think tanks ahead of pivotal June elections, a step that would go some way to addressing the Kremlin's historic use of populist individuals and parties to sow discord within the bloc.
Barbarians at the gate: Von der Leyen makes foreign influence a key campaign topic – POLITICO - The plan von der Leyen pitched for her second term includes setting up a European disinformation unit to detect, coordinate and share analysis from other national agencies, along with potentially new rules to tackle new technologies like AI deepfakes.
France warns of threat to elections from Russian disinformation network with far-right links (irishexaminer.com) - French officials said there were “documented links” between the far-right Front National in France and Russia.
Far-Right Group Recruits Followers To Overwhelm Election Offices With Voter Roll Challenges (talkingpointsmemo.com) - True the Vote is enlisting private citizens to help it overwhelm under-staffed and under-resourced election offices with voter roll challenges ahead of election day.
BIRN Doc Lifts Lid on Russian Disinformation in Balkans | Balkan Insight - A documentary produced in Bosnia, Kosovo and Montenegro explores the scale of Kremlin-backed disinformation in these countries and its dangerous influence on the public.
US intelligence spotted Chinese, Iranian deepfakes in 2020 aimed at influencing US voters | CNN Politics - The National Security Agency collected the intelligence that gave US officials insights into China and Iran’s capabilities in producing deepfakes, one of the sources said.
The Lies that Put Our Lives At Risk - CAA Chinese For Affirmative Action - Chinese for Affirmative Action (CAA) has documented 104 major pieces of pro-gun disinformation circulating on Chinese-language social media platforms.
Analysis: NewsClick-Chinese funding and possibility of election interference in India (opindia.com) - The Delhi Police have cracked down on NewsClick, financed by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) member Neville Roy Singham. In its chargesheet, the cops have revealed that the leftist propaganda news portal was working for its “ultimate paymaster” China.
FBI restarts communications with social media companies over ‘disinformation’ ahead of 2024 election | The Post Millennial | thepostmillennial.com - Senator Mark Warner, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, revealed at a briefing during the RSA Conference that intelligence agencies, including the FBI, have resumed discussions with social media companies in preparation for the upcoming 2024 election.
The rise of information disorder in African elections, Part 2 (dailymaverick.co.za) - op-ed: 2024 is a major election year. With Senegal (March) and South Africa (May) as some of Africa’s leading democracies going through elections in the first half of this year, this has triggered a reflection on democracy in Africa.
Next Africa: A Lesson for the World From Senegal‘s Elections - Bloomberg - The former administration used the pretext of fighting misinformation and disinformation to try and keep the then-ruling party in power in the West African nation — to no avail. Misinformation escalates to disinformation when inaccurate reports are intentionally deceiving.
Japan enacts revised law targeting defamatory online posts - Nikkei Asia - Law will push Facebook, X and others to handle claims more quickly.
Slovakia’s Fico plots to dismantle the free press – POLITICO - Journalists warn new populist prime minister is trying to sideline those in the media he disagrees with.
Cameron says government has stopped funding disinformation index (thetimes.co.uk) - GDI ratings agency, which blacklisted the Unherd news site over gender-critical content, is longer receiving money from the Foreign Office.
On the way to deep fake democracy? Deep fakes in election campaigns in 2023 | European Political Science (springer.com) - On the use of deepfakes in 11 elections in 2023.
Should Democratic Governments Use Deepfakes? | Lawfare (lawfaremedia.org) - Governments should weigh the risks of diminishing their credibility when deciding when, if ever, to use deepfakes.
Elon Musk’s Diplomacy: Woo Right-Wing World Leaders. Then Benefit. - The New York Times (nytimes.com) - Mr. Musk has built a constellation of like-minded heads of state — including Argentina’s Javier Milei and India’s Narendra Modi — to push his own politics and expand his business empire.
The spread of misinformation varies by topic and by country in Europe, study finds (phys.org) - The ratio of questionable news vs. reliable news consumption and spread varied between countries. Overall, Germany had the highest ratio of questionable news retweets to reliable news retweets on all three topics, with France in second, followed by Italy, and the UK had the lowest proportion of questionable news retweets overall.
South Africa: Analysis Reveals Polarized Views on South Africa's Electoral Process - allAfrica.com - A new report by the Centre for Analytics and Behavioural Change (CABC) sheds light on the polarized online conversation about South Africa's upcoming elections.
Truth be told: How India's Gen Z is handling the fake news epidemic | Analysis | Campaign Asia - A recent survey by The 23 Watt reveals concerning trends: Fake news is widespread, and 91% of Gen Z in the capital region believe it can influence voting decisions.
Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares at the Signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on Foreign State Information Manipulation - United States Department of State - and one more, a partner that can help covering this time Latin America.
Five Questions for the US Senate Intelligence Hearing on Foreign Threats to the 2024 Election | German Marshall Fund of the United States (gmfus.org) - The US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is holding a hearing “to examine an update on foreign threats to the 2024 elections”. ASD at GMF outlines five questions committee members should ask.
An Assessment of the PRC Fifth Column Network within Taiwan | Global Taiwan Institute - This article provides a preliminary examination of the characteristics and scale of China’s fifth column networks within Taiwan’s national security agencies since 2008, and forecasts likely trends in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) fifth column operations during the upcoming term of President-elect Lai Ching-te (賴清德).
'Russian' hackers deface potentially hundreds of local British news sites (therecord.media) - the return of Ghostwriter?
Covert Connections: The LinkedIn Recruitment Ruse Targeting Defense Insiders > Air University (AU) > Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs Article Display - other forms of foreign interference that should not be underestimated.