Entering the 2024 Election Year
Dates to mark in your calendar - Taiwan elections are just around the corner - some tips to keep in mind in the coming weeks.
Hey there. My name is Margot Fulde-Hardy.
For those who don’t know me, I spent the last two and a half years at Viginum, the French agency countering foreign information operations. OSINT investigations, keeping an eye on new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and developing cooperation projects with the international community—these are a few of the things I did during my time there. But what excited me the most was leading a project to defend the 2022 French Presidential and Parliamentary Elections against online electoral interference.
After diving into information operations and elections' integrity from 2013 to 2023, I've picked up some know-how. Now, I'm kicking off this newsletter to keep the community in the loop on what's coming this year. My goal is to gather global news and insights, supporting everyone—whether you're on the Threat Intelligence side or the Trust and Safety side—in staying ahead of threats targeting the information environment. Let's make sense of the upcoming information flood on elections. So, let's jump right in!
Who are the potential targets?
You have probably already heard many times that 2024 will be THE Election Year. But do you actually know who will be having elections this year? Have you made a calendar? If not, here’s one for the first semester of 2024:
January 7, 2024 – Bangladesh election
January 13, 2024 – Taiwan election
January 28, 2024 - Finland election
February 4, 2024 – El Salvador election
February 14, 2024 – Indonesia election
February 25, 2024 – Senegal election
February 25, 2024 – Belarus election
February 2024 – Pakistan election (delayed from 2023)
March 10, 2024 – Portugal election
March 17, 2024 – Russia election
March 17, 2024 – Slovakia election
March 31, 2024 – Ukraine election
April 10, 2024 – South Korea election
April 2024 – Solomon Islands election
April 2024 – Maldives election
May 5, 2024 – Panama election
May 12, 2024 – Lithuania election
May 19, 2024 – Dominican Republic election
June 2024 – Mongolia election
June 1, 2024 – Iceland election
June 2, 2024 – Mexico election
June 6-9, 2024 - EU Parliament Elections
June 9, 2024 – Belgium Election
And, if you prefer a map view, here’s a great one from Foreign Policy:
Several dates in the second semester are still uncertain, so I'll provide details on those in another newsletter. But circle November 5th on your calendar for the U.S. Election – not that anyone's gonna forget that blockbuster day.
Talking about blockbuster: what’s up with Taiwan?
You may have noticed in the news (or in the previous calendar, at least) that Taiwan will be having a general election this Saturday. Why is the Taiwan election important to watch?
Geopolitically speaking, Taiwan’s future plays a crucial role in the balance of power between the U.S. and China. Since the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) took office in 2016, the country has drawn closer to the United States and distanced itself from the People's Republic of China's 'One China Policy.' Although Taiwan has lost several allies, particularly from Latin America in recent years, its ties with the West have strengthened.
Taiwan holds significant importance for the West on various fronts, including its dominance in the chip industry. Yes, those little chips that are urgently needed for our cellphones, computers, or cars. According to The Economist, Taiwan produces 60% of the world’s semiconductors and 90% of the most advanced ones.
In the 2024 election, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has a clear objective: to favor the candidate who will bring Taiwan closer to Beijing once again. Among the two other parties, the KMT and the TPP, the KMT seems the most likely, if elected, to engage with the PRC. How will this translate into the cognitive operations led by the PRC’s operators?
Actor: since its first publicly documented case of digital electoral interference in 2018, the PRC has employed a range of actors against Taiwan, including the 50 cent army, content farms, shell companies, local influencers and sock puppet accounts.
Behavior: Laundering information through Taiwanese outlets, creating sock puppet accounts to pose as Taiwanese citizens, flooding platforms with videos, and communicating in the Taiwanese dialect are among the most common Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) we can expect from the PRC in 2024, based on its previous cases of electoral interferences.
Recent reports have also highlighted new tactics: the use of deepfake videos and the publication of fake polls on a fringe outlet.
Narratives: While the PRC has previously focused its efforts on discrediting or supporting specific candidates, since 2022, it has demonstrated the capacity to detach itself from endorsing a particular candidate. Instead, it spreads information manipulation to polarize the Taiwanese population around specific topics. This trend continues this year, with the main narrative being:
'The election is about a choice between war and peace with China.'
Other narratives tend to increase fears and anxieties of the Taiwanese population about their economic security.
Efforts to discredit the DPP’s candidate, Lai Ching-Te, are also evident, especially on Tiktok with one disseminated narrative portraying him as a foreign agent from the US.
Degree: The PRC has expanded its operations over the years to encompass all platforms where the targeted audience engages in discussions. While social networks like X, Facebook, and Instagram may still be relevant, the focus has shifted towards videos, making TikTok and YouTube the primary areas to monitor. Discussion boards and chat applications such as Line are also spaces where the PRC disseminates its narratives. Most notably, Taiwan remains vulnerable to the consumption of junk news. Taiwanese outlets are known to be susceptible to external funding, often channeled through shell companies operated from abroad.
What do you need to read to be ready for this Saturday?
Disinformation, fake news cloud Taiwan's presidential race - Los Angeles Times (latimes.com) the latest TTPs.
Taiwan voters face flood of pro-China disinformation (france24.com) another article about the latest TTPs.
‘Troublemaker’ and ‘Pawn’: US-related Narratives Amid Taiwan’s Presidential Election – The Diplomat on narratives and because I am based in the US.
China bombards Taiwan with fake news ahead of election – POLITICO a summary to catch up if you didn’t follow the latest months.
Rip off the Blindfold: Let Taiwanese Civil Society Learn From Ukraine – The Diplomat an interesting insight from the visit of DoubleThink Lab’s CEOs in Ukraine.
A Preliminary Assessment of CCP Political Warfare Targeting Taiwan’s 2024 Elections | Global Taiwan Institute to get the broader picture from one of Taiwan’s main think tank.
假冒在地民意的舶來品:臉書境外粉專介入台灣選舉手法解析 | 台灣民主實驗室 | 台灣民主實驗室 (medium.com) for those who can read Chinese or use the translation tool. A story from DoubleThink Lab about fake Facebook accounts operating from Cambodia and targeting Taiwan’s election.
Your press corner
Here’s the weekly readings to keep you connected to all the conversation on global elections and information operations:
Beyond the U.S.: The World’s Most Important Elections in 2024 (foreignpolicy.com)
North Korea likely to carry out psychological warfare ahead of elections: official - The Korea Times
Navigating Election Risks: A Guide for Executives | Recorded Future
How FBI, NSA are preparing for deepfakes ahead of 2024 elections (cnbc.com)
Deepfakes Aren't the Disinformation Threat They're Made Out to Be | RAND\
The rising threat to democracy of AI-powered disinformation (ft.com)
What comes next?
Before we say goodbye until next week, here’s a few thoughts from myself:
Many elections mean priorisation.
Priorisation of targets: Not all elections are likely to be targeted by information operations. Some may hold more significance to threat actors in terms of foreign policy objectives. For example, elections in Taiwan or the U.S. may be prime targets. Certain threat actors might anticipate higher impact and return on investment by focusing on specific targets. Attempting to interfere in Senegal’s elections, for instance, could have repercussions on the stability of the entire Sahel region. As threat actors prioritize their targets, make sure to prioritize your election watch!
Priorisation of ressources: In 2015-2016, Russia and Iran were actively involved in interfering with the United Kingdom's EU referendum and the U.S. elections. They frequently repurposed their botnets and trolls, shifting from one country to another. As you commence monitoring online assets, be vigilant about their past history. There's a possibility they might suddenly change their editorial line or even language.
Priorisation of efforts: As observed in 2022, threat actors like Russia were less active in the U.S. midterm elections, as Moscow's focus was on Ukraine. In 2020, Iran engaged in 'perception hacking' during the U.S. elections, which is to let people believe that there is some kind of electoral interference without directly hacking the election systems. This was also highlighted in Meta’s last adversarial threat report. Bluff could be the most potent asset for threat actors this year!
Thank you for taking the time to dive into this newsletter and let me know what you thought about it and tips to improve it!