Election Expedition
Touring Solomon Islands, Taiwan, Chad, Togo, North Macedonia, Croatia, Romania, Spain and the United Kingdom - Your Press Corner
Hey there.
This week, we are taking a trip around the world to observe the online dynamics surrounding the latest elections. We will visit Solomon Islands, Taiwan, Chad, Togo, North Macedonia, the UK and Spain.
These are all places where cases of online manipulation have been reporting. Not necessarily foreign, but with the possibility to jeopardize election integrity. As you can see, I am also adjusting my writing journey as we discover together the patterns and trends of online information manipulation in elections. It would be too limiting to cover only “foreign”, when current instances of domestic information manipulation can bear the same harmful effects as cases of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI). Domestic suppression of online freedoms, manipulation of the media, and targeting of journalists can contribute to the decline of democracy in states, serving the objectives of authoritarian states.
Nonetheless, whether it is FIMI, D-IMI or something else, this framing of democracies versus authoritarian states seems more and more artificial every day. The porosity of online borders is also affecting our offline behaviors. The recent example of French government banning TikTok in New Caledonia shows that banning apps is not limited to authoritarian states…
So let’s tour the world, looking for these reports out there provided by those who are sensitive to online harms and documenting how our world might look like in 2025.
What to be expected:
Taiwan Elections - The Chinese Cycle of Information Manipulation
North Macedonia, Croatia and Romania - Chinese Influence and Domestic Information Manipulation
United Kingdom Election - Political Campaign Turns Into Information Manipulation
Solomon Islands Election - Russian Chinese Coordination
First stop, Solomon Islands. A little paradise in Oceania, but also one of the poorest countries in the Pacific. The country seeks both security and development partners in the region, making it a target both for China and Australia, who compete for influence in the Pacific to win the regional power play.
For instance, during the Pacific Games hosted by the Solomon Islands in 2023, China funded much of the Games. China’s offer is economic security and development, which is much needed in the islands. Meanwhile, Australia has been a traditional regional security partner, also contributing to the development of the country.
Therefore, in the 2024 elections, the Australian Strategy Policy Institute (ASPI) was naturally paying careful attention to attempts by China to interfere in the elections. What ASPI discovered was not only an attempt by Chinese actors but also a coordination between Russian and Chinese actors to manipulate the online local debate.
The campaign consisted of the following tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs):
An information laundering strategy by Russia-affiliated actors: An inauthentic claim that the U.S. government, through USAID, was seeking regime change in Solomon Islands was published in CovertAction Magazine, a Russia-affiliated media. The story was then covered by the Russian state media Sputnik, without referencing to CovertAction Magazine, and further amplified by Chinese state media Global Times, which did reference CovertAction magazine.
The dissemination of a forged letter among Solomon Islanders: This letter, allegedly written by a consultant of International Foundation For Election Systems, claimed that USAID was attempting to manipulate the elections, echoing the previously mentioned articles.
An amplification strategy via official coverage: Chinese state media wrote at least six articles covering the claim. The Chinese MFA also supported the claim on its website.
The narrative was denounced by the U.S. government, notably through its Embassy to Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. According to ASPI, while it is not the first time that China and Russia have coordinated on narratives, the choice of Solomon Islands demonstrates that this strategy is now global.
From my own point of view, this incident is reminiscent of the strategy used in the Armenian election in 2017, where a forged letter also circulated, implying that the U.S. through USAID, was attempting to interfere in the election.
Taiwan Elections - The Chinese Cycle of Information Manipulation
As announced in the first editions of this newsletter, Chinese cognitive warfare in the case of Taiwan is not limited to the weeks before the election and the day of the election. China has been using a whole arsenal of hybrid threats to attempt to destabilize the Taiwanese elections until the Presidential inauguration day, which took place last Monday.
Let’s do a brief stop to observe the tactics used:
Increased military activities around the island: Military aircraft, naval vessels, patrols have increasingly crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait as well as navigating near Taiwan’s outlying island, Kinmen.
Economic coercion: China has cut preferential tariffs and trade on certain goods from Taiwan. It also recently lifted up sanctions on the import of Pomelos after a visit from Taiwanese Party Kuomintang to China.
Diplomatic pressure: China has been multiplying the declarations to reassert its one-China principle, such as during the Munich Security conference. After the inauguration, China condemned the U.S., Japan, and South Korea’s for congratulating Taiwan on the election.
The tactics were denounced last Monday in the speech of the newly inaugurated Taiwanese President Lai. Meanwhile, China blocked the coverage of the inauguration on its Chinese platforms such as Weibo and labeled President Lai a “separatist”.
Chad and Togo Elections - Suppressing Press Freedom
Leaving the Asian continent, we land in Chad where concerns have been raised by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) about the suppression of press freedoms.
Chad held its Presidential election on May 6 to end military rule. After three years of junta-led transition imposed following the death of Idriss Déby Itno, this election was supposed to support the democratic transition of the country. However, with the son of the previous leader, Mahamat Idriss Déby competing in the campaign, there is little hope that this election will indeed lead to a renewal for the country. What tactics were observed during the campaign?
Using affiliated media outlets to campaign: Mahamat Déby gave an interview to a media outlet, Manara Radio Television, which did not exist at the time of the interview. It was officially created after the broadcast of the interview and was revealed to be linked to Mahamat Idriss Déby’s affiliates.
Shutting down independent journalists and media: Independent journalists and media were prevented from covering the candidate’s campaign. Two media outlets were suspended by Chad’s media regulator.
Banning interactive broadcasts: The High Authority for Media and Broadcasting banned all interactive broadcasts during the campaign. At least 19 radio stations, 24 print newspapers, and seven online newspapers were banned for obscure reasons.
Threats to journalists: Journalists were intimidated, some almost kidnapped and one of them even shot dead.
During Togolese elections, which took place on April 29 , local media and journalists also faced repression. The editor of the newspaper La Depeche was arrested and charged with the “publication of fake news with the aim of inciting the public or the military to rise up against the state”. Amnesty International has also denounced the crackdown on media in its annual report on human rights. Meanwhile, Togo’s media regulatory body suspended accreditation for foreign media, prohibiting outlets like France 24 and Radio France Internationale (RFI) from reporting on the elections.
The use of the media regulatory body as well as the targeting of independent journalists appear to be a common behavior between Chad and Togo to control the information environment and the narratives surrounding the elections.
North Macedonia, Croatia and Romania - Chinese Influence and Domestic Information Manipulation
North Macedonia held its presidential and parliamentary election on April 24 and May 8. North Macedonian authorities have stated that China has been disseminating its propaganda in the run-up to the election.
North Macedonia, and more largely the Western Balkans, are targets of Chinese influence. According to the Center for European Policy Analysis, China pursues three objectives in North Macedonia: strategic, economic and ideological. The strategic objective is to create support for Chinese policies in various international fora. The economic objective is linked to the Belt and Road initiative, as North Macedonia holds a strategic position as a candidate for EU membership. The ideological objective is to diffuse the “Chinese way” in the country as an alternative to Western values.
Chinese tactics in North Macedonia rely on Chinese Ambassadors in the country, as well as the dissemination of Chinese narratives through domestic unregulated online portals.
In the context of this year’s election, what have been observed so far regarding Chinese influence in North Macedonia? Mostly Chinese propaganda aimed at increasing euroscepticism. This propaganda was likely endorsed by the leftist and populist party Levica, notably on their online news portal Antropol.
Meanwhile, Croatia, which held elections on April 17, was the target of online information manipulation from unknown sources.
Member of Parliament Katarina Peovic and her party Workers Front (Radnicka fronta) was targeted by an information campaign to discredit the party. Domestic actors, the rap duo Tram 11, shared a picture of the MP holding a banner with lyrics on it from a song by Serbian nationalist singer Baja Mali Knindza. Fact-checkers debunked the inauthentic photo.
The ruling party Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)’s publications on Facebook received likely artificial amplification from accounts appearing to be localized in Vietnam.
In Romania, whose elections are due in December this year, Parliament discussions are ongoing about the possible ban of TikTok in the country. TikTok has been accused of being the “playing field” for Russian propaganda.
Catalan Elections - Undermining Electoral Integrity
Spain’s Catalan region held its election on May 12. Don’t ask me about Spain’s organization regarding elections and why Catalan had its own regional election on May 12; it is a long administrative boring and complex story. A story that EU members are trying to understand in the European Cooperation Network on Elections, a network aimed at facilitating understanding and information sharing on elections between EU member states. If you are interested in Spain’s elections, the meeting minutes can provide good insights for you.
By sharing information about electoral processes, the intent of such networks is to identify inauthentic claims and the exploitation of the complicated administrative environment in EU countries and EU elections. However, during the Catalan elections, Spain could not avoid the “electoral fraud” narrative, which has been recurring since the 2023 Spanish elections. Furthermore, Catalonia was previously targeted by Kremlin-affiliated state media and Venezuelan proxies during the 2017 Catalan independence referendum. If you don’t remember the story, here you go.
In 2024, the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) reported that inauthentic allegations about electoral fraud circulated, even before the end of the polling. These claims consisted of the repeating narrative that candidates had offered money for votes and allegations that a railway network incident was a sabotage to prevent people from voting.
These false claims were debunked by one of Spain’s main fact-checking organizations Maldita.
United Kingdom Election - Political Campaign Turns into Information Manipulation
Our last stop this week is the United-Kingdom. The UK voted in local elections on May 2 and will vote again in general elections later this year. The United Kingdom has previously faced online information manipulation during Brexit as well as in the 2019 general elections. Russia and Iran were typically the main suspects, while China has been more recently condemned for its hacking and spying actions in the UK.
In the local 2024 elections, Russia, Iran and China are apparently nowhere to be seen. Instead, the Conservatives were accused of spreading manipulated information against the Labour Party, mainly targeting London Mayor Sadiq Khan.
The main narrative being reported is the claim that another tax on drivers is coming. This is done through leaflets allegedly distributed by the Conservative Party in London, which bear a QR code for protesting against the supposed tax. According to the reports, this could be a tactic to collect voters’ data. Meanwhile, right-wing media have claimed that the Mayor is investing in “£150mn in “secret” technology aimed at facilitating a pay-per-mile scheme”.
This claim has been debunked by the organisation Full Fact, which has started a petition “Stop politicians from pretending to be your local newspaper” to raise awareness about these practices.
And that’s it for today! I hope you enjoyed this little tour around the world and were able to catch up with the latest state of the art.
One thing is sure, we humans never lack creativity.
But we are also prone to copying what worked well in the past.
Your Press Corner
Here’s the weekly readings to keep you connected to all the conversation on global elections and information operations:
European Union bans four media outlets for peddling Russian propaganda | Euronews - The European Union has announced a ban on four media outlets accused of spreading pro-Kremlin propaganda and "destabilising" Ukraine's neighbouring countries.
French TikTok block in overseas territory sets ‘dangerous precedent,’ critics warn – POLITICO - An unexpected and drastic measure to cut off access to the app in New Caledonia marks an EU first.
Our freedoms depend on press freedom (independent.co.ug) - An important comment from Uganda.
Electoral Code and protection of journalists: Parties take note (dailymaverick.co.za) - The media matter. Journalists matter. It seems that we need to remind the political parties of their obligations under the Electoral Code – without credible media there can’t be credible elections.
Alleged RET ‘Guptabots’ migrated overnight to Zuma’s MK party (dailymaverick.co.za) - A report by the Centre for Analytics and Behavioural Change has described how the online RET community deserted the EFF and migrated en masse to the MK party.
F.B.I. Shed Informants Linked to Russian Influence Operations - The New York Times (nytimes.com) - After a secret review several years ago, the bureau cut off confidential sources thought to be connected to Russian disinformation.
How the Kremlin launders disinformation around the globe (info-res.org) - the information laundering strategy.
How a Chinese Influence Operation Is Targeting Pro-Trump Communities Online | Lawfare (lawfaremedia.org) - Spamouflage is famous for being widespread and ineffective. A new tactic targeting Trump supporters suggests that may be starting to change.
Will Massive State-Funded Disinformation in Hungary Give Orbán One More Win? | German Marshall Fund of the United States (gmfus.org) - Strong campaigning skills are one reason why Viktor Orbán has won four consecutive elections in Hungary. But he has also never been shy about spending public money heavily to influence citizens with falsehoods.
Why is Central Europe at heightened risk of fake news ahead of European elections? | Euronews - Recent statistics show that at least half of the population in countries such as Slovakia, Poland and the Czech Republic are exposed to misinformation online.
Hacktivist Groups Target Indian Elections, Leak Personal Data, Says Report (hackread.com) - Multiple independent hacktivist groups are targeting India’s elections with influence campaigns, Resecurity reports. The campaigns are designed to sway voters’ opinions and undermine trust in the democratic process.
76 million attempts to scam you on X, using celebrities - Maldita.es - In recent months, X (formerly Twitter) has been flooded with ads using the image of public figures and media outlets. These redirect to web pages that offer false investments in cryptocurrencies where they steal personal data from users or encourage them to make a “first investment” that is never recovered.
‘Uncharted terrain’: How officials, campaigners and fact-checkers tackle AI’s influence on elections around the world – POLITICO - Developing countries, many of which hold elections this year, struggle to keep up with the emerging tech absent regulations and technical know-how.
A.I. and the Election: See How Easily Chatbots Can Create Disinfo for Social Media - The New York Times (nytimes.com) - To understand how worrisome the threat is, NYT customized its own chatbots, feeding them millions of publicly available social media posts from Reddit and Parler.
European Tech Law Faces Test to Address Interference, Threats, and Disinformation in 2024 Elections | Council on Foreign Relations (cfr.org) - About the DSA’s use ahead of the EU elections.
Framework Interoperability: A New Hope for Global Digital Governance | Lawfare (lawfaremedia.org) - someone said framework?