From Taiwan to Finland, a story of resilience
Last Takeaways on Taiwan Election - The One Billion Dollar Question - Finland Resilience Model - with a reflection on assessing impact - The EU-US Competition on Frameworks
Hey there. It’s been yet another week filled with news addressing the topic of foreign information manipulation and interference in elections. In this newsletter, I will attempt to provide a representative summary of the main issues at stake in the past days. Expect a competition of buzzing words such as resilience, deepfake audios and impact!
Last Takeaways from Taiwan Election
Before turning the page (for now) on the Taiwan election, there are still a few key takeaways worth noting from the latest reporting by Albert Zhang, an analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. In his article, he brings clarity on the following elements:
2 threat actors can actually be distinguished in this case of interference. One is the now infamous Spamouflage/Dragonbridge actor, who is linked to the amplification of the previously mentioned fake document about former President Tsai Ing-wen. The second actor is likely connected to the coordinated inauthentic behavior (CIB) network identified by Meta at the end of 2023.
The second actor mentioned by Albert Zhang used cyber-enabled FIMI tactics to disseminate alleged leaked documents as well as an inauthentic DNA paternity test of elected-President Lai Ching-te. The use of such tactics reminds us of another threat actor, Secondary Infektion, linked to Russia, who also used in the past the dissemination of alleged leaked documents in cases of electoral interference. Furthermore, the use of medical data to undermine the reputation of a candidate or a party recalls other information operations such as in Nigeria in 2015 when Cambridge Analytica, with the help of Team Jorge, circulated the hacked medical file of candidate Muhammadu Buhari to spread the narrative that his health would not allow him to lead the country if elected. This also reminds us of the narrative that was spread in 2020 and is still ongoing about U.S. President Biden’s health. All these cases show a similar and constant pattern across actors of weaponizing private medical information to discredit a candidate. Mimicry and the replication of previous actions are inherent behavior of threat actors, which, in a way, is a positive thing as it gives us the ability to foresee what could be coming next.
Finally, this extremely detailed article also underscores that some of the inauthentic accounts detected are engaged in information manipulation activities targeting the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) ahead of India’s elections this year. Remember what I said about prioritization of resources? This is a first indicator that same resources may be used for multiple campaigns targeting various elections across the globe.
That’s it for my last takeaways, but I really recommend reading Albert Zhang’s article to get all the details. Another very good resource to get analysis and insights is Ari’s newsletter called Memetic Warfare (bi)Weekly. You will find a lot of valuable insights with strong OSINT and CTI expertise, which is rare. Check it out!
The One Billion Dollar Question: Assessing the Impact of Information Operation Campaigns
Many stories highlighted this week the resilience of Taiwan’s society against China. For instance, the Diplomat got an in-depth report about the public-private partnerships countering information manipulation in Taiwan, or what is often called “a whole-of-society approach”. As the most targeted country globally by foreign information operations according to this dataset from the Digital Society Project, Taiwan has developed over the years a strategy that includes an open government national action plan and an open parliament action plan, embracing a collaborative approach with civil society. Notable civil society actors include fact-checking organizations such as the Taiwan FactCheck Center or CoFacts, research organizations like DoubleThink Lab, think tanks such as the Global Taiwan Institute, and coalitions of activists like the g0v movement.
While it is true that Taiwan has developed numerous initiatives at both the government and civil society levels to raise awareness against digital interference, the question arises: how can one assess the resilience of Taiwan’s society during this year’s elections? Is this purely strategic communication to deter Chinese actors and reaffirm Taiwan’s position on the international stage, or are there lessons we can learn from the Taiwanese case?
The approach taken by DoubleThink Lab may give us some answers on what can be done to assess the reach of foreign information manipulation campaign and the resiliency of a society. In the context of its 2024 MHub project, a collaborative initiative with local actors, to observe foreign influence during the Taiwan 2024 election, the think tank conducted two studies: a nationwide pre-election telephone survey and an exit-poll in Tao-yuan City, the most ethnically diverse urban area in Taiwan.
The pre-election surveys asked Taiwanese respondents about their perception of different domestic issues and allegations such as “The Taiwanese government benefits specific companies, providing citizens with subpar vaccines and contaminated eggs” or “The United States only wants to exploit Taiwan”. The surveys measured the extent to which people agreed or disagreed with these allegations.
The exit-poll in Tao-yuan City once again measured the perception of Taiwanese respondent on these allegations. Comparing with previous surveys conducted during the Taiwan 2022 local election, DoubleThink Lab reached a preliminary conclusion:
Micro-influencers, described in the surveys as “online video content creators” or “Key Opinion Leaders on social platforms” have a growing influence over Taiwanese society.
The DPP is seen as the primary actor in election-related information manipulation.
Trust towards the election system remains strong.
Regarding narratives targeting the US, the results are mixed and demonstrate significant polarization between the DPP, KMT and TTP supporters.
This approach, conducting surveys to measure the extent to which people agree or disagree with a particular narrative, is particularly relevant, in my opinion. As our international common database of threat actors’ narratives grows stronger, it may be time not only to monitor the dissemination of narratives but also to assess their reach.
For instance, we could imagine a project where we conduct pre-election surveys in European countries ahead of the European Parliament Election in June. Weeks before the elections, based on our knowledge of ongoing narratives that would be circulated or amplified by threat actors, we would ask respondents similar questions to the Doublethink’s lab study to measure European citizens’ perception of such narratives. In the aftermath, similar surveys would be conducted to assess the growth and persistence of these narratives.
Of course, details of the survey methodology need to be discussed. Fortunately, we have excellent resources and expertise available, such as the EUvsdisinfo website, the EDMO hub repository of fact-checking articles, the Global Disinformation Index’s narratives-focused in-depth research, the EuDisinfo Lab’s disinformation landscape series, and many other great actors across Europe. Perhaps, it is time to shift our focus away from behavioral aspects and enhance our monitoring of narratives. Only these narratives will tell us, in the end, who ultimately won this political warfare. Who’s in?
Speaking of Resilience, the Finland Election Are Right Around the Corner
Next Sunday, the 28th, Finland will hold its presidential election. Should we be worried? Well, perhaps less than with other elections. Finland has been considered the number one model country when it comes to tackling foreign information manipulation. Since 2017, it has ranked first in the New Media Literacy Index developed by Open Society Institute - Sofia.
There’s been extensive reporting over the years on how Finland sets an example for the rest of the world’s countries here, here and here. Finland can count on a high-level education system, strong editorial freedom and a high level of trust in the government and national news media. These reports emphasize how Finland has integrated media literacy courses into its education program from the earliest stages. The Finnish model includes both more traditional capacity-building exercises and experimental educational tool.
During the parliamentary elections of 2023, Finland demonstrated a creative and innovative society. It was able to spot pro-Russia trolls spreading manipulated information about NATO and Finland in the context of the war in Ukraine and Finland’s recent accession to NATO.
However, according to this EU DisinfoLab’s report, there are concerning trends that warrant renewed vigilance during this year’s Finnish and EU elections. In addition to Russian’s disinformation, there has been a growing polarization and radicalization of Finnish society. Moreover, there is an increased influence of online far-right communities, such as accelerationists and neo-Nazis. There is a particular community called “The Truth Seekers” that spreads conspiracy theories with the aim of increasing distrust towards the government and mainstream media.
As outlined in EU DisinfoLab’s report, these domestic networks serve as vehicles for anti-NATO and anti-Ukraine narratives. They can be regarded as amplifiers of Russian information campaigns. The Russian information campaigns also involve allegations of Finnish abductions of Russian children, claims of US pressure on Finland’s application to NATO or allegations that NATO membership threatens Finnish independence. In the latest reporting, it appears that Russian information campaigns are accompanied by hybrid warfare tactics, including Moscow pushing undocumented migrants across the border to use migration as a tool of destabilization. According to the Finnish Security Intelligence Service (Supo), Moscow is targeting these asylum seekers to recruit them as spies and send them in Finland under the guise of being refugees.
In the realm of hybrid threats, cybersecurity attacks pose a real danger. Finland was targeted by cybersecurity attacks during its national elections in 2019. And recent reports suggest that it remains a threat in this year’s election. According to Cyberexpress, the NoName ransomware group, suspected to have Russian affiliations, has escalated its cyberattacks against critical sectors in Finland.
But let’s stay positive!
Finland is already demonstrating a resilient approach. For instance, TRAFICOM, the National Cyber Security Centre, recently published an article to prepare the Finnish population against potential hybrid threats during the elections. The article gives information about DDoS attacks, disinformation and deepfake technology. The pre-bunking approach, aiming at raising awareness among the population, could prove to be very effective. The National Cyber Security Centre is also helping local actors such as municipalities to improve their cybersecurity.
We can also count on the reporting from the main Finnish NGO countering-disinformation Faktabaari. Finland is also the host country of the Hybrid Center of Excellence, an autonomous, network-based international organization, countering hybrid threats.
While we are awaiting this weekend’s election, if you are curious about Finland’s resilience model, check out this report from 2024.
Your press corner
Here’s the weekly readings to keep you connected to all the conversation on global elections and information operations:
Fausses chaînes YouTube : quand « Sophie décrypte » ou « 360 Vision » travaillent pour un réseau d’influence pro-Chine (lemonde.fr) - Chinese actors have their own distinct network of female influencers in France.
Influencers Sow Disinformation Questioning Legitimacy of Election | New Bloom Magazine - in Taiwan’s elections, online influencers have been accused of spreading disinformation.
‘Dear media friends’ – China interferes in Honiara media over Taiwan, reveals In-depth Solomons | Evening Report another revelation about Chinese tactics to control narratives about Taiwan in other countries, through intimidation and manipulation of news media outlets.
Voting in Beijing’s Shadow: The People’s Republic of China Interferes in the 2024 Taiwanese Elections – Alliance For Securing Democracy (gmfus.org) - Analysis on Taiwan Election by Etienne Soula, Alliance for Securing Democracy at GMF.
Threats and Disinformation: The Election Deniers’ Playbook for 2024 – Brewminate: A Bold Blend of News and Ideas - Analysis on the tactics underlying the election denial narrative and their evolution since the U.S. midterms in 2022.
Russia’s elections toolkit: dollars, disruption and disinformation (globalgovernmentforum.com) - 2nd episode of the electoral interference saga presented by Global Government Forum.
US warns of Russian effort to tilt 2024 elections in Europe against Ukraine | Reuters - in case you missed last week the State Department’s warning on Russian information operations targeting Europe.
Pro-Kremlin groups twist EU lawmakers’ words to ‘pollute’ politics, memo warns – POLITICO - and in case you missed as well the European Parliament’s warning.
OpenAI bans bot impersonating US presidential candidate (techxplore.com) - a bot created by Delphi startup who was then shut out from OpenAI’s platform.
New Hampshire Officials to Investigate A.I. Robocalls Mimicking Biden - The New York Times (nytimes.com) - first appearance of deepfake audio in U.S. election…
Election security 2024: Authorities 'concerned' about potential threats ahead of New Hampshire primary - ABC7 Chicago … but apparently the New Hampshire Information and Analysis Center (NHIAC) didn’t see it coming.
Three technology trends shaping 2024's elections | MIT Technology Review - a focus notably on micro-influencers.
From cartoon lions to channelling dead dictators, here's how artificial intelligence is being used in elections around the world - ABC News - behind the doors of political campaigns in India, featuring deepfake content and controversial requests.
Call for action on deepfakes as fears grow among MPs over election threat | Politics | The Guardian - meanwhile in the UK.
Africa’s 2024 Elections: Challenges and Opportunities to Regain Democratic Momentum – Africa Center for Strategic Studies. A really good report on the election year in Africa. Add Mali, Senegal, South-Africa and Tunisia to your Election Watch for potential information manipulation campaigns.
How misinformation will impact the Latino community ahead of 2024 elections (dallasnews.com) - a focus on one targeted audience in the U.S.
And two other alternative publications, framing the U.S. as a threat actor targeting Indonesia’s Elections or its own domestic audience. I guess political warfare is a matter of perspective, isn’t it?
Methodology and Frameworks: the EU vs the U.S.
One word that often comes back in our field is “framework”. What is a framework? It is a tool to structure our understanding of what we are investigating. A powerful tool, it can shape our minds and perceptions through the development of a standardized approach. It has both positive and negative effects. It can bring our community closer, bridging cultural differences, or it can create a hierarchy between those developing the framework and those applying it. In this context, both the U.S. and the EU are competing to offer a suitable framework to counter disinformation, one that would be used globally. They both published in the last days their own framework to respond to foreign information manipulation and interference.
Last Thursday, the U.S. State Department published its “Framework To Counter Foreign State Information Manipulation”. This framework is viewed as a tool to “deepen cooperation between like-minded partners, establish a common operating picture, and support the development of resilient, fact-based information ecosystems”. It sets 5 key actions areas, namely (1) national strategies and policies; (2) governance structures and institutions; (3) human and technical capacity; (4) civil society, independent media, and academia; and (5) multilateral engagement.
The text is concise, and these actions areas, while not being overly detailed, serve as common areas where the U.S. seeks cooperation with its partners globally. Nothing seems particularly new or revolutionary; instead, it appears to be a synthesis of good practices that need enhancement. What’s more interesting is the timing of this publication - just five days before the EU’s own framework (see below). It says something about the U.S. strategy, aiming not to be seen as following the EU’s footsteps but rather leading the international community. As a result, the EU’s framework could be interpreted as an implementation of the U.S. key action areas. Well-done Stratcom Team. However, it appears that the EU has more to offer than a one-page framework compiling on-going efforts.
This Tuesday, the EU published its 2nd Foreign Information and Manipulation (FIMI) Threat Assessment. It is based on a sound methodology developed two years ago and a growing sample of FIMI cases targeting the EU (750 cases from 1 December 2022 to 30 November 2023). Beyond its valuable insights into the state of play of the threat ahead of the 2024 EU Parliament election, the report also proposes a “Response Framework to FIMI Threat”.
Based on the responses observed in previous cases, this flexible framework “aims to further our collective ability to tackle this issue and to enable the diverse defender community to develop their own response plans, inviting them to complement and adapt.”. It consists of three pillars:
Cross-domain Analysis: this involves integrating data from various sources, such as proprietary data or public opinion research, to strengthen the analysis.
Adapted Countermeasures: this includes four types of countermeasures - ignore, contain, minimise, redirect.
Mechanisms for Collective Response: these are the steps to be taken by all relevant actors to respond to an incident in a coordinated manner.
This report sends a signal to the world that the EU is ready to move beyond the analysis of FIMI threats and translate this analysis into concrete actions to counter threat actors. Over the past few years, I have closely engaged with the EU External Action Service team responsible for developing this framework. We have spent hours discussing methodology, frameworks, information-sharing and experimenting stuff. I can confirm how impressive and remarkable they have been in paving the way for the international countering-FIMI community in such a short amount of time and with limited resources. I hope you will take time to dig into their valuable report, even though it is a bit technical I have to admit.
The success of this framework will nonetheless depend on the adherence of the international community. As with many other reports, it continues to prompt questions about the precise use of terms such as ‘threats’ or ‘risks’, ‘strategies’ or ‘objectives’ and others. For any framework to succeed, there is a need to continue working on our common terminology in a collaborative and open manner. This will facilitate understanding and reduce gaps between stakeholders.
…
EU vs U.S. Framework Game Results
Stratcom and terminology: EU 0 - US 1
Methodology and Structure: EU 1 - US 1
Creativity and Innovation: EU 1 - US 0
Impact: to be monitored in the next months…
Thank you for taking the time to dive into this newsletter and let me know what you thought about it and tips to improve it!